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REGULATING OBJECTIONABLE CONTENT IN
MULTIMEDIA PLATFORMS: WILL
CONVERGENCE REQUIRE A BALANCE OF
RESPONSIBILITIES BETWEEN SENDERS AND
RECEIVERS?
Otilio Gonzalezt
I. INTRODUCTION
National attempts to control, or at least limit, transmission of
objectionable speech in the electronic media might result in failure
because the absence of physical frontiers in the new electronic media,
coupled with the current patterns of convergence, make regulations
aimed at the speaker very difficult to enforce. An option is to shift
from the traditional regulatory model based on the speaker to a
paradigm based both on electronic media speakers and receivers. The
United States might be in the threshold of such a regulatory shift, as
more regulations addressing the availability of objectionable
programming depend on technology-based blocking mechanisms
controlled by the receiver of the information: the end user of the new
electronic media.
This paper addresses constitutional and policy implications of
such a regulatory transition. First, a definition of objectionable
speech is provided, along with a discussion of how traditional content
regulations have attempted to provide constitutional solutions to the
problems associated with the exposure of minors to that content.
Second, the paper takes a brief look at how the elements of
convergence and transnationalism of electronic media affect the
implementation of traditional regulatory approaches based solely on
the speakers. Finally, the paper suggests that a variable approach,
which balances responsibility between speakers and receivers for
t Associate Professor, Department of Communications, University of Puerto Rico in
Arecibo; Ph.D., College of Journalism and Communications, University of Florida; J.D.,
University of Puerto Rico. I would like to thank Dr. Bill Chamberlin, Joseph L. Brechner
Eminent Scholar in Mass Communications, University of Florida, and Dr. Milagros Rivera-
Sanchez, Associate Professor, National University of Singapore.
610 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. [Vol. 20
exposure of minors to objectionable content in the electronic media,
might assist policy-makers in their interest in protecting minors from
harm. It is argued that the United States might be taking the initial
steps in that direction, relying on end user-controlled blocking
mechanisms that allow parents and other guarding adults to pre-
determine content to be accessed by minors under their care.
However, gaps in technology might delay full implementation of such
an approach.
II. REGULATION OF OBJECTIONABLE SPEECH IN THE ELECTRONIC
MEDIA
Regulation of objectionable content in the electronic media has
usually attracted the attention of policy makers. A definition of what
constitutes objectionable content is no easy task because it is
accompanied by moral, religious and personal beliefs and tastes. For
the purposes of this paper, a definition that can be applied to the
United States legal and political framework considers objectionable
content as the origination and transmission of illegal and controversial
materials over the electronic media. This definition is expanded in
the next subsections.
Speech Declared Illegal
The legal protection provided to any form of speech will depend
on the political, social, and moral values assigned to it.' In the United
States, the Supreme Court has held that the government can prohibit
materials that are not protected by the free speech clause of the First
Amendment of the Constitution. Examples of speech not garnering
constitutional protection include false or misleading advertising,2 and
fighting words-the expressions that "inflict injury or tend to incite
an immediate breach of the peace." 3 Pornographic content classified
1. In Argentina, for example, broadcasters are required to transmit programming which
promotes the "cultural enrichment and the moral elevation of the population.., and the rules of
the Christian moral." Law No. 22285, Sept. 15, 1980, [XXXVII] Anales de Legislacion
Argentina [A.D.L.A.] 21 (Arg.). See also Scott L. Goodroad, The Challenge of Free Speech:
Asian Values v. Unfettered Free Speech, an Analysis of Singapore and Malaysia in the New
Global Order, 9 IND. INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 259, 261-62 (1998) (noting how several unique
Asian values, such as strong family connections, the predominance of the community rights over
the individual rights, and the need to maintain a well ordered society, affect the interpretation of
free speech laws in several countries of East and South East Asia, including Malaysia and
Singapore).
2. See Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 771
(1976).
3. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942).
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as obscene is also outside the scope of this constitutional protection.4
The availability of pornography in mass media has been a constant
cause of concern for regulators.5 Although it is difficult to provide a
definition of "pornography" because multiple definitions of the term
are closely related to social expectations of individuals and groups,6
the definition usually includes erotic depictions of human nudity and
images of sexual intercourse.7 Regardless of calls for a total ban on
pornographic images in the media made by some religious and family
organizations, the erotic depiction of these pornographic images does
not constitute a form of illegal content unless it can also be defined as
obscene content.8
Foreign legal systems punish objectionable speech based on their
countries' sociopolitical contexts. Like in the United States, the
transmission of sexually explicit materials is a cause of concern in
several nations, and some have even declared that their citizens do not
have a right to see pornographic materials. 9 Nonetheless, in a number
of countries certain forms of speech that are constitutionally protected
4. In Miller v. California, the Court established three criteria for identifying obscene
materials:
... (a) whether the average person, applying contemporary community standards
would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest; (b)
whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual
conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law; and (c) whether the
work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific
value.
413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973) (citation omitted).
5. See generally OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GEN., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ATTORNEY
GEN.'S COMM'N ON PORNOGRAPHY: FINAL REPORT (1986).
6. The use of the term "pornography" presents a definition problem, as it is usually the
lay person's way of referring to nudity, sexual or excretory images or expressions, by applying
individual standards. Rather than relying on the individual definitions, the courts will rely on
the definitions provided by the Supreme Court for obscenity. See Miller, 413 U.S. at 24;
Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 559-63 (1969); Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413, 418
(1966); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 489 (1957). See also Regina v. Hicklin, 3 L.R.-
Q.B. 359, 369 (1868).
7. Pornography is defined here as follows:
Written, graphic, or oral depictions of erotic subjects intended to arouse sexual
excitement in the audience. Pornography is commonly divided into two
categories: soft-core, in which the erotic material is more titillating than explicit;
and hard-core, in which erotic content is explicit and intense .... Historically,
most objections to pornography have been based on religious grounds.
FUNK & WAGNALLS NEW ENCYCLOPEDIA 2003, available at http://www.lexis.com.
8. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1464-65 (2000) (criminalizing obscenity). See also Miller, 413
U.S. at 23-24; Roth, 354 U.S. at 485 (noting that obscene speech is not protected by the First
Amendment).
9. In Singapore, for example, there is no constitutional right to view or hear
pornographic materials. See Goodroad, supra note 1, at 275.
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in the U.S. might constitute a form of illegal speech. 10 Examples of
these variable international standards include the following
prohibitions: hate speech against ethnic or racial groups," web sites
containing Nazi items,1 2 speech that is contrary to national moral
customs and traditions,' 3 and speech considered to be offensive to
religious values. 14
Controversial Speech
Controversial speech is defined here as legally protected speech
that can be considered "offensive and disagreeable" by some
recipients. 15 In the U.S., the courts have mentioned various types of
speech that could be classified as controversial, including:
blasphemous and profane speech,' 6 racist and other hate speech,' 7
threats and other forms of harassment,' 8 indecent and other sexually
10. See Michael L. Siegel, Hate Speech, Civil Rights, and the Internet: The Jurisdictional
and Human Rights Nightmare, 9 ALB. L.J. Sci. & TECH. 375, 391 (1999).
11. See generally Kim L. Rappaport, In the Wake of Reno v. ACLU: The Continued
Struggle in Western Constitutional Democracies with Internet Censorship and Freedom of
Speech Online, 13 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 765, 787 n.85 (1998) (noting that German courts have
upheld the validity of national laws against defamatory and racist hate speech). See also Chris
Gosnell, Hate Speech on the Internet: A Question of Context, 23 QUEEN'S L.J. 369, 381-82
(1998).
12. Lisa Guernsey, Welcome to the Web. Passport, Please?, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 15, 2001,
at GI.
13. Id. For example, Singapore, Malaysia, Brunei, Indonesia, Philippines, Thailand and
Vietnam have agreed to block access to Web sites containing speech that is considered to be
against "Asian values." Siegel, supra note 10, at 391-92.
14. See Stuart Wallace, Cyberspace Waves Fail to Wash Away Gulf Taboos, AGENCE
FRANCE-PRESSE, Apr. 20, 1999, available at 1999 WL 2586883. See also Siegel, supra note
10, at 392.
15. See Catherine J. Ross, Anything Goes: Examining the State's Interest in Protecting
Children from Controversial Speech, 53 VAND. L. REV. 427, 446-47 (2000).
16. Originally a religious crime, blasphemous speech refers to speaking maliciously and
contemptuously of God and religion. The courts have considered the constitutionality of state
and municipal statutes prohibiting profanity or profane swearing and in a number of cases it has
been held that state statutes prohibiting the use of profane language in a particular locale is not a
violation of the First Amendment. See 12 AM. JUR . 2D Blasphemy and Profanity §§ 1, 7
(1997).
17. The definition of hate speech, originally limited to speech offensive to races or
"group libel" has been expanded to include not only offensive speech as to racial or ethnic
groups, but also speech regarded as offensive to other social components, such as religious
groups and women. See generally Siegel, supra note 10.
18. Compare Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572-73 (1942) (noting that
fighting words aimed at provoking an average person to fight are not protected by the First
Amendment) with Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 524-25 (1972) (striking down a Georgia
statute that prohibited abusive language tending to breach peace as unconstitutionally vague and
overbroad; noting that fighting words must cause violence on an individual, not on a group) and
Vill. of Skokie v. Nat'l Socialist Party of Am., 373 N.E.2d. 21, 23-24 (Ill. 1978) (affirming that
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explicit materials,' 9 and transmission of violent content or images.20
Some of these categories of speech might be considered illegal
elsewhere, but the U.S. constitutional framework classifies such
speech as permissible, though offensive. 21  The Supreme Court has
insisted that the government's role is not to protect citizens who
might find a message offensive:
[T]he fact that society may find speech offensive is not a sufficient
reason for suppressing it. Indeed, if it is the speaker's opinion that
gives offense, that consequence is a reason for according it
constitutional protection. For it is a central tenet of the First
Amendment that the government must remain neutral in the
marketplace of ideas.
22
Because of this constitutional protection, an individual facing
controversial speech that he wants to avoid shall either listen to the
speech, or move away from it. 23 An exception to this "walk-if-you-
don't-like-what-you-hear" rule occurs when an individual is a
"captive audience" with no opportunity to ignore a message. 24  If
the American Nazi Party has a right to parade and display Nazi symbols). See also United
States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 382 (1968) (burning a draft card is not symbolic speech, and
thus is an unprotected form of speech). But cf Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 419 (1989)
(burning a U.S. flag may be symbolic speech, and is protected by the First Amendment).
19. In Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 636-37 (1968), the Supreme Court held that
sexually explicit material which is not obscene, but rather indecent, may be withheld from
minors without restricting the expression at its source. In FCC v. Pacifica Found, 438 U.S. 726,
732, 748 (1978) the Supreme Court affirmed an administrative decision of the Federal
Communications Commission that defined indecency as language that describes sexual or
excretory activities and organs in a "patently offensive" manner as measured by contemporary
community standards for the broadcast medium, at times of the day when there is a reasonable
risk that children may be in the audience.
20. Telecommunications Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C. § 303 (2000) (congressional findings of
the Parental-Choice-in-Television-Programming provision of the Act of 1996).
21. See Am. Library Ass'n v. Pataki, 969 F. Supp. 160, 168-69 (S.D.N.Y. 1997). Also,
in his concurring opinion in Consol. Edison Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 530,
546-48 (1980) Justice Stevens wrote the following:
[A] communication may be offensive in two different ways. Independently of
the message the speaker intends to convey, the form of his communication may
be offensive-perhaps because it is too loud or too ugly in a particular setting.
Other speeches, even though elegantly phrased in dulcet tones, are offensive
simply because the listener disagrees with the speaker's message. The fact that
the offensive form of some communication may subject it to appropriate
regulation surely does not support the conclusion that the offensive character of
an idea can justify an attempt to censor its expression.
22. Pacitica, 438 U.S. at 745-46.
23. In many locations outside the home individuals are expected to simply avoid the
speech they do not want to hear. See, e.g., Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 210-
11 (1975). See also Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 21-22 (1971).
24. See Columbia Broad. Sys. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 127-28 (1973).
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audiences are considered to be captive, then the controversial
messages can be regulated as intrusive but the regulation cannot result
in a total ban of the protected speech. 25  The Supreme Court has
warned that Congress or the states cannot use the protection of minors
as a justification for prohibiting a constitutionally protected form of
speech because such an action would result in limiting adults to only
what is fit for children.26
Controversial Speech Deemed "Harmful to Minors"
In a sense, minors are treated as captive audiences when it comes
to certain controversial materials. Actions resulting in regulations
aimed at avoiding exposure of minors to certain controversial speech
based on its harmful effects on minors are justified by a compelling
interest of the state in protecting minors from harm.27 It has been
suggested that controversial materials that are "harmful to minors"
include the presence of content that disseminate "information and
propaganda promoting racism, anti-Semitism, extremism, and how-to
manuals on everything from drugs to bombs. 28 Notably, the interest
of policy makers has centered on a smaller scale on violent
programming and on a larger scale on indecent materials.
Social science researchers have considered the harmful effects
associated with exposure of minors to violent speech more often than
the effects of other forms of speech. A Surgeon General's report
released in January 2001 summarized the major findings of scientific
research associated with violent speech and concluded that there is a
correlation between exposure of minors to violent images and
potential harms, mainly the shaping of aggressive behavior in
minors. 29 The American Academy of Pediatrics (AAP) agrees that
Whether an audience can be considered as "captive" depends on the options that members of the
audience may have to avoid the message. Consol. Edison, 447 U.S. at 542 ("Passengers on
public transportation... or residents of a neighborhood disturbed by the raucous broadcasts
from a passing sound truck may well be unable to escape an unwanted message."). See also
Lehman v. Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 301-02 (1974) (plurality opinion) (noting that
passengers in a streetcar are a captive audience because they cannot avoid billboards posted on
the streetcar).
25. See Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 748-50 (holding that the impossibility to avoid intrusive
broadcasts justify nuisance regulations adopted by the FCC requiring broadcasters to channel
indecent materials to hours when children were not expected to be in the audience).
26. Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 634-35 (1968). See also Sable
Communications of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 127 (1989).
27. Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 639-40. See Sable Communications, 492 U.S. at 126.
28. S. REP. No. 106-141, at 4 (1999).
29. U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., YOUTH VIOLENCE: A REPORT OF THE
SURGEON GENERAL 87 (2001), available at
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exposure to violence has "a clear and reproducible effect on the
behavior of children."
30
Although considerable debate has accompanied the definition of
what constitutes "harm" in exposing minors to sexually explicit
materials, a position accepted by a congressional committee suggests
that exposing minors to pornography "distorts the natural sexual
development that should occur gradually throughout childhood."'"
"Harmless" sexual materials, however, remain fully protected by the
Constitution.
Sexually explicit materials that are not considered to be obscene
under the test developed by the Supreme Court in Miller v. California
might be classified as indecent.32 Indecent materials can include
various forms of speech that, although offensive to some, have social
value and may include information related to topics such as abortion,
childbirth or any aspect of human sexuality.33 When considering
minors' access to indecent speech, the Court has affirmed the validity
of state actions regulating the distribution of content which is
protected for adults, but is harmful to minors because the state has an
interest in protecting the health, safety, welfare and morals of
children.34 As a result of that constitutional interpretation, there are
regulations requiring broadcasters to channel indecent speech to a
safe harbor period when minors are less expected to be among the
audiences.35 Although the Supreme Court requires the use of local
contemporary community standards for identification of obscene
http://www.surgeongeneral.gov/library/youthviolence.
30. American Academy of Pediatrics, Statement for the Senate Commerce, Science and
Transportation Committee on the Television Rating System (Feb. 27, 1997), available at
http://www.aap.org/advocacy/washing/tvratsys.htm (last visited Feb. 23, 2004).
31. As a consequence, it is argued, minors develop "distorted beliefs about human
sexuality" which might include a perception that "pathological behavior is normal, is common,
hurts no one, and is socially acceptable, the female body is for male entertainment, sex is not
about intimacy and sex is the basis of self-esteem." S. REP. No. 106-141, at 3 (1999) (notes of
Mary Anne Layden, Director of Education, Center for Cognitive Therapy, University of
Pennsylvania) (explaining that "[m]any people-including children and adolescents-learn
about sex through pornography; it shapes their beliefs, attitudes, and expectations .... The
prevalence of violent, abusive, and degrading pornography can induce beliefs that practices are
not only common, but acceptable.").
32. 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973).
33. Alliance for Cmty. Media v. FCC, 56 F.3d 105, 129 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (Wald, J.,
dissenting), rev'd in part sub nom. Denver Area Educ. Telecomms. Consortium v. FCC, 518
U.S. 727 (1996). See also Ross, supra note 15, at 446-48.
34. Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 637-43 (1968).
35. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 732-33 (1978).
20041
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materials, such a standard has not been applied to indecent speech.
36
The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) developed the only
standards to regulate indecent speech, which provide for the
identification of indecent materials using broader "national"
standards.37 The FCC defines indecency in broadcasting as "language
that describes, in terms patently offensive as measured by
contemporary community standards for the broadcast medium, sexual
or excretory activities and organs," and has said that its primary
regulatory interest lies in protecting children from "language which
most parents regard as inappropriate for them to hear." 38 The FCC
developed a similar standard for indecency on cable television,39 but
the Commission has not applied national standards to other electronic
media.4 °  Congress, however, adopted a local standard for
transmission of materials that are "harmful to minors" on the World
Wide Web in the Children Online Protection Act of 1998
("COPA"),41 and for the development of Internet library policies
blocking access of minors to harmful content online in the Children
Internet Protection Act of 2000 ("CIPA"). 42
36. Id. at 740-41.
37. The transmission of indecent materials, as well as the broadcast of profane or obscene
materials by means of radio communication, constitutes a criminal offense. 18 U.S.C. § 1464
(2000) (also incorporated in the Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 312(a)(6)). In
interpreting these provisions, the FCC defined indecent speech in broadcasting as language that
is patently offensive by contemporary community standards in the broadcast medium, and is
utterly without redeeming social value. See In re WUHY-FM, Eastern Education Radio, 24
F.C.C.2d 408, 412 (1970); In the Matter of a Citizen's Complaint Against Pacifica Found.
Station WBAI (FM), 56 F.C.C.2d 94, 98 (1975) (noting that the concept of indecency was
intimately connected with the exposure of children to patently offensive language that describes
sexual or excretory activities and organs, at times of the day when there is a reasonable risk that
children may be in the audience).
38. See Citizen's Complaint Against Pacifica Found. Station WBAI (FM), 56 F.C.C.2d at
98.
39. Leased Access Channels, 47 C.F.R. § 76.701 (2002) (indecent programming).
40. In Cyberspace Communications, Inc. v. Engler, 55 F. Supp. 2d 737, 745, 747-48
(E.D. Mich. 1999), the district court noted the difficulty of applying a local community standard
because the information on the Intemet travels randomly, crossing several communities before a
recipient receives the message. As the Supreme Court noted in Reno v. ACLU, "[o]nce a
provider posts its content on the Intemet, it cannot prevent that content from entering any
community." 521 U.S. 844, 853 (1997) (quoting ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 844 (E.D.
Pa. 1996)). But see Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S. 564, 583 (2002).
41. 47 U.S.C. § 231 (2000).
42. 20 U.S.C. §§ 7001, 9134, and 47 U.S.C. § 254(h) (2000).
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Traditional Regulations Follow a Sender-Based, Medium-
Specific Approach
Regulations of content in the electronic media targeting
controversial speech-including speech that is harmful to
minors-are content-based restrictions of speech that traditionally
target the sender, rather than the receiver of the information.43 A long
history of policy-making efforts for the electronic media has resulted
in the application of different standards for content-based regulations
in the electronic media, based on the economics and technology of
each medium.4 Broadcasting, for example, might endure more severe
content restrictions than other electronic media because the natural
scarcity of the airwaves requires broadcasters to serve as fiduciaries
for the public, who must present the "views and voices" that represent
their communities.45 Also, the government might impose more
restrictions on broadcasters because the broadcast media have
established a "uniquely pervasive presence in the lives of all
Americans. '46 More regulations could be imposed on broadcasting
because radio and television are "uniquely accessible to children,
even those too young to read.'
47
Regulatory treatment of other electronic media will depend on a
medium-specific approach considering scarcity and pervasiveness.
With each new electronic medium, Congress, and the FCC have
struggled to apply traditional broadcast regulations to the new
technologies, 48 but the Supreme Court has established that special
characteristics of each electronic medium might require different
regulatory treatment.49  Therefore, the limited First Amendment
43. See Harry T. Edwards & Mitchell N. Berman, Regulating Violence on Television, 89
Nw. U. L. REV. 1487, 1500 (1995) (comparing content-neutral and content-based restrictions in
the electronic media).
44. Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 386 (1969); Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S.
at 595 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment).
45. Red Lion Broad Co., 395 U.S. at 389. See also FCC v. League of Women Voters of
Cal., 468 U.S. 364, 377 (1984).
46. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 748 (1978).
47. Id. at 749.
48. See, e.g., United States v. Playboy Entm't Group, Inc. 529 U.S. 803 (2000); Reno v.
ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997); Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180 (1997); Denver
Area Educ. Telecomms. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727 (1996); City of Los Angeles v.
Preferred Communications, 476 U.S. 488 (1986); FCC v. Midwest Video Corp., 440 U.S. 689
(1979); Cruz v. Ferre, 755 F.2d 1415 (11th Cir. 1985); Cmty. Television of Utah, Inc. v.
Wilkinson, 611 F. Supp. 1099 (D. Utah 1985), af'd, 480 U.S. 926 (1987); Cmty. Television of
Utah, Inc. v. Roy City, 555 F. Supp. 1164 (D. Utah 1982); Home Box Office, Inc. v. Wilkinson,
531 F. Supp. 987 (D. Utah 1982).
49. See Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 748 (noting that each method of communications or medium
2004]
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protection for broadcasting cannot automatically be extended to other
electronic media because they might not be relying on scarce
resources, or might not be as pervasive and intrusive as
broadcasting. 50 For example, the Court has noted that differences in
cable television technologies separate this medium from
broadcasting. 51  The Court distinguished cable television from
broadcasting because there is potential for an unlimited availability of
channels provided by cable platforms,52 and there is no physical
interference between a speaker and a cable system because of cable's
capacity "to block unwanted channels on a household-by-household
basis. 53
The Supreme Court has also provided another important
distinction between broadcasting and electronic media that requires
users to engage in specific acts to access the messages, like the
Internet. Before sustaining the constitutionality of nuisance
restrictions on controversial speech in other electronic media the
courts will consider the pervasiveness--or intrusiveness-of each
electronic medium affected by content-based regulations.54 Such a
determination requires a careful assessment of the interaction between
the medium sending the information and the receiver of the
information. 55 However, as it will be discussed in the next section,
the increasing technological convergence of the electronic media
of expression presents special First Amendment problems); Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v.
Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 557 (1975); Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 503 (1952);
Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 97 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring) (stating that each method of
communicating ideas is "a law unto itself' and that the law must reflect the "differing natures,
values, abuses and dangers" of each method).
50. However, the compelling interest of the government in protecting minors from harm
remains a valid concern for all electronic media. See Playboy, 529 U.S. at 811; Denver Area
Educ. Telecomms. Consortium, 518 U.S. at 747; Reno, 521 U.S. at 865. See also Sable
Communications of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989); ACLU v. Reno, 217 F.3d 162,
173 (3d Cir. 2000), vacated sub nom. by Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S. 564 (2002); Action for
Children's Television v. FCC, 58 F.3d 654, 661 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
51. Playboy, 529 U.S. at 815-16. See also Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S.
622, 639 (1994).
52. Turner, 512 U.S. at 639.
53. Playboy, 529 U.S. at 815.
54. Controversial speech can be regulated in the broadcast media by principles analogous
to the law of nuisance. See Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 731. A nuisance rationale for content-based
regulations follows an approach similar to the "time-place-manner" content-neutral restrictions,
which speaks of channeling a behavior rather than actually prohibiting it. "Time-place-manner"
restrictions allow states to regulate content restricting the time of the speech, the place where it
occurs, or even how it happens. See generally Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781,
790-91 (1989).
55. Sable Communications, 492 U.S. at 120-21; Reno, 521 U.S. at 876.
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might make this medium-specific approach useless, as the new
multimedia platforms allow receivers of the information to access
different media through singe electronic devices.
III. THE NEW ELECTRONIC MEDIA MIGHT REQUIRE NEW
APPROACHES TO REGULATE ACCESS OF MINORS TO
OBJECTIONABLE CONTENT
The electronic media is in a stage of transition, from apparently
disconnected elements separated by the paths of transmission
(airwaves, lines, satellites, etc.) into electronic multimedia platforms.
Reliance on television and radio for information is now accompanied
by an increasing use of other electronic media. From cable television
to satellite television and radio, from new telephone-based
information services to the ever-increasing number of services
provided by the Internet, users now access information from
alternative sources. 56 New media and old media are merging to
provide access and content to an advanced information network,
where end users go for information and entertainment. These patterns
of convergence are present both as a result of technological
innovations that allow for multimedia platforms,57 as well as changes
in ownership promoted by the Telecommunications Act of 1996,
which fostered a wave of mergers and acquisitions among electronic
media industries.
58
As a result of these changes, mass communications in the United
States are in a state of "massive transition" that might lead into a
"single electronic pipe" where print, video and sound will be digital,
indistinguishable from one another. 59  These changes are also
reshaping traditional perceptions of the electronic media. As a recent
industry report suggests, convergence will probably result in end
users moving "seamlessly from one medium to another on the same
delivery platform-TVs or PCs.
60
56. See generally In the Matter of Inquiry Concerning Deployment of Advanced
Telecommunications Capability to All Americans in a Reasonable and Timely Fashion, and
Possible Steps To Accelerate Such Deployment Pursuant To Section 706 of the
Telecommunications Act of 1996, 15 F.C.C.R. 20913 (2000). See also John Rothchild,
Protecting the Digital Consumer: The Limits of Cyberspace Utopianism, 74 IND. L.J. 893, 900-
05(1999).
57. WILSON DIZARD, JR., OLD MEDIA NEW MEDIA: MASS COMMUNICATIONS IN THE
INFORMATION AGE 193 (2d ed. 1997).
58. Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56, 56 (1996).
59. DizARD, supra note 57, at 193.
60. BROADCAST CONNECTION, TV Viewing Internet Households (May 1999), available at
http://www.broadcastconnect.comtvviewing.html (last visited Feb. 18, 2004).
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How to Regulate Objectionable Content in a Converged
Electronic Media?
The U.S. legal system is struggling with the rapidly changing
new electronic media environment.6 ' Convergence of the electronic
media poses a formidable task to regulators. As different media
transmit their content across multimedia platforms, regulators face a
complicated regulatory scenario that challenges the validity of
traditional medium-specific regulations. 62 Each medium is regulated
differently, but end users receive messages from diverse electronic
media in the same receiving device. As a result, as one researcher
puts it, under the current system of regulations, a radio program can
be prohibited at certain times of the day if transmitted over the
airwaves, but a simultaneous transmission on the Web cannot be
regulated.63  Obvious constitutional questions arise, because, at least
in theory, it is possible to anticipate that a speaker wanting to transmit
a message across converged platforms would have to adapt to the
most stringent medium-specific regulation. For example, if a
broadcast speaker delivers his messages both through the airwaves
and through the Internet, he might be compelled to adapt his speech to
the broadcast standards, even if the Internet enjoys a more relaxed
regulatory environment.
On the other hand, a prohibition of transmission of illegal speech
might be easier to enforce in traditional electronic media, such as
radio and television.64 But in a new electronic media environment
61. See M. Ethan Katsh, The First Amendment and Technological Change: The New
Media Have a Message, 57 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1459, 1493 (1989).
62. In light of the trends of convergence of the different electronic media, First
Amendment scholars and media lawyers have criticized the medium-specific approach to
electronic media. See, e.g., ITHIEL DE SOLA POOL, TECHNOLOGIES OF FREEDOM, 226-34
(1983). See also Robert Corn-Revere, The State of the First Amendment at the Approach of the
Millennium: Symposium: Rationales and Rationalizations - Chapter 1: Red Lion and the
Culture of Regulation, 5 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 173 (1997); Eric M. Freedman, A Lot More
Comes into Focus When You Remove the Lens Cap: Why Proliferating New Communications
Technologies Make it Particularly Urgent for the Supreme Court to Abandon its Inside-Out
Approach to Freedom of Speech and Bring Obscenity, Fighting Words, and Group Libel Within
the First Amendment, 81 IOWA L. REV. 883 (1996); Allen S. Hammond, Regulating the Multi-
Media Chimera: Electronic Speech Rights in the United States, 21 RUTGERS COMPUTER &
TECH. L.J. 1 (1995); Stephen J. Shapiro, One and the Same: How Internet Non-Regulation
Undermines the Rationales Used to Support Broadcast Regulation, 8 MEDIA L. & POL'Y 1
(1999); Cass R. Sunstein, The First Amendment in Cyberspace: Emerging Media Technology
and the First Amendment, 104 YALE L.J. 1757 (1995).
63. See Nadine Strossen, Symposium 1998: Should Cyberspace be a Free Speech Zone?:
Filters, "Family Friendliness, " and the First Amendment, 15 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 1
(1998).
64. See Sable Communications of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 127-28 (1989).
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where end users might be able to move from one medium to another
through the same receiver without major complications, enforcement
of an absolute ban presents regulators with jurisdictional problems. 65
The transnational nature of this new electronic media
environment challenges the ability of national governments to enforce
content-based regulations, in particular those regulations based on
local legal and moral values. Enforcement of national laws targeting
objectionable speech is easier in traditional electronic media, such as
broadcasting and cable television, because the senders of the
information are located within the territorial boundaries of the state
and must adhere to the local laws or else risk losing whatever
authorization is required to operate. 66 However, the effectiveness of
national laws aimed at the sender of the information is challenged
when the lack of jurisdiction over speakers transmitting from another
nation diminishes the ability of the state to prosecute those engaged in
transmission of the material from another jurisdiction where the
material is not considered illegal.67 Threats of local judicial actions in
several jurisdictions could impose a burden on speakers of content
classified as controversial in a jurisdiction, but illegal in another.68
Recent judicial determinations in Europe demanding that Yahoo!
limit access of local end users to sites containing hate speech, a
category considered illegal in many countries, is an early example of
one problem associated with the delivery of controversial content
across media platforms capable of reaching audiences from abroad.
Convergence of the electronic media might force a revision of
the medium-specific approach that provides different regulatory
treatment to each electronic medium. The Supreme Court has
recognized that the dynamic changes in the electronic media,
promoted by their evolving technological nature, require evolving
65. Several researchers have considered a diversity of problems related to jurisdiction and
the Internet. See, e.g., Siegel, supra note 10; Amber Jene Sayle, Net Nation and the Digital
Revolution: Regulation of Offensive Material for a New Community, 18 WIS. INT'L L.J. 257
(2000); Scott Sterling, International Law of Mystery: Holding Internet Service Providers Liable
for Defamation and the Need for a Comprehensive International Solution, 21 LOY. L.A. ENT. L.
REV. 327 (2001); Timothy S. Wu, Cyberspace Sovereignty?-The Internet and the
International System, 10 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 647 (1997).
66. An exception can be made here of stations operating in the frontiers of two or more
countries. See generally Konate A. Modibo, Regulatory Aspects of Creating Private
Audiovisual Communication Services, at
http://www.itu.int/lTU-R/conferences/seminars/bamako-99/docs/4-konate.doc (last visited Feb.
26, 2004).
67. See Wu, supra note 65, at 655-56.
68. See generally Lyombe Eko, Many Spiders, One Worldwide Web: Towards a
Typology ofInternet Regulation, 6 COMM. L. & POL'Y 445 (2001).
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regulatory solutions. As the Court noted, "solutions adequate a
decade ago are not necessarily so now, and those acceptable today
may well be outmoded 10 years hence.,
69
IV. REGULATORY RESPONSE: A VARIABLE APPROACH BASED ON
SENDERS AND RECEIVERS
Policy-makers must balance society's interests in protecting
minors from harmful materials and other speech considered illegal or
offensive that are available in the electronic media with the right of
individuals to receive information.70  This right to receive
information, embedded in the First Amendment of the Constitution is
not extended to minors because the Supreme Court has noted that the
state has a compelling interest to protect minors from the harmful
effects of objectionable materials. 71 But the constitutional right to
receive information and ideas "regardless of their social worth" is a
fundamental right in society.72
An approach that considers the right of individuals to receive
information, and which could assist regulators in controlling access of
minors to the controversial content in the electronic media impacted
by convergence is the adoption of regulations that focus on the
receiver as well as on the sender of the information. This regulatory
shift might be possible thanks to technological innovations in the
electronic media.
New technologies are available that allow end users to block
unwanted electronic media messages in their homes, which might
alter the "intrusive" nature of the electronic media. Blocking
mechanisms reliant on technology include channel-blocking devices
that allow parents to lock out pre-determined cable television
channels with a key or private code, 73 electronic chips capable of
blocking unwanted programming in television based on a system of
69. Columbia Broad. Sys. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 102 (1973).
70. See Allentown Mack Sales & Service, Inc. v. NLRB, 522 U.S. 359, 386-87 (1998)
(Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753,
762-63 (1972); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969).
71. See, e.g., Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 869 (1997); Sable Communications of Cal.,
Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989); Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 638-39 (1968).
72. Stanley, 394 U.S. at 564. Bd. ofEduc. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 866-67 (1982). Butsee
United States v. Reidel, 402 U.S. 351, 355-56 (1971) (reversing a lower court's extension of the
right to receive information and possession of information and ideas).
73. 47 U.S.C. § 544(d)(2). See also Implementation of the Provisions of the Cable
Communications Policy Act of 1984, 50 Fed. Reg. 18637, 18655 (May 2, 1985).
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ratings,74 and content filters that allow end users to block Web sites,
words or images in the Internet.7 5
A regulatory alternative focused on both sender and receiver of
information might take the form of a legislative mandate to adopt a
blocking system designed to help parents and other adults screen
speech according to pre-assigned categories and labels attached by
others.76 This mode of regulation could protect those uninterested
adults and minors from the harmful effects of offensive-but
constitutionally protected-speech available in the electronic media,
while at the same time preserve the interested adults' rights to receive
such information. It could also assist adults in blocking illegal speech
from entering their homes.
At least in theory, in a blocking system end users determine what
messages they receive. In such a system, a government does not need
to eliminate certain forms of controversial content for the sole
purpose of protecting segments of an audience from the alleged
harmful effects of any messages transmitted.7 7  Parents would be
empowered to block the controversial content that they want to
withhold from their children.7 8 Probably unaware of it, policy makers
in the United States might be taking the initial steps for such a
regulatory approach, relying on blocking mechanisms for limiting
access of minors to controversial speech in separate electronic media.
Regulating Objectionable Content in the Electronic Media
Through Blocking Mechanisms.
In the United States, Congress has legislated to promote the use
of blocking mechanisms controlled by end users. The earliest
legislative effort took place in 1984, with the passing of the Cable Act
of 1984, which included a provision mandating cable operators to
provide a channel blocking device, called a lockbox, to requesting
subscribers. 79 More than a decade later, with the V-Chip system and
Internet filtering software, Congress relied again-more than
74. See generally Glen Dickson, How's It Work?, BROADCASTING & CABLE, Feb. 12,
1996, at 24 (explaining that the basic technology used for the V-chip is the same as that used for
closed-captioning).
75. See C. Dianne Martin, An Alternative to Government Regulation and Censorship:
Content Advisory Systems for Interactive Media, in THE V-CHIP DEBATE 182-83 (Monroe E.
Price ed., 1998).
76. Ross, supra note 15, at 439.
77. United States v. Edge Broad. Co., 509 U.S. 418, 439 (1993) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
78. See Edwards & Berman, supra note 43, at 1514.
79. Cable Communications Policy Act, 47 U.S.C. § 544(d)(2) (2000).
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once-on blocking mechanisms for regulating objectionable speech
in the electronic media. 80
Lockboxes.
The first U.S. regulatory experience with an end-user-controlled
blocking mechanism intended to assist in regulating access to
objectionable materials in the electronic media occurred with the
adoption of a congressional provision, as part of the Cable
Communications Policy Act of 1984 ("CCPA"), that mandated cable
operators to provide a channel-blocking device-by sale or lease-to
requesting subscribers.8'
Congress approached a public controversy surrounding the
availability of controversial speech in cable TV-and in particular the
availability of sexually explicit materials on cable's leased access
channels-by adopting two different regulatory strategies in the
CCPA.82  First, Congress granted power to local authorities to
regulate leased access programming that the franchising authority
would consider to be "obscene, or [was] in conflict with community
standards in that it [was] lewd, lascivious, filthy, or indecent or [was]
otherwise unprotected by the Constitution of the United States.,
83
The second approach was the adoption of the lockbox provision.84 It
establishes the following:
In order to restrict the viewing of . . programming which is
obscene or indecent, upon the request of a subscriber, a cable
operator shall provide (by sale or lease) a device by which the
subscriber can prohibit viewing of a particular cable service during
periods selected by that subscriber.85
The device was commonly known as the lockbox.86 Although
not the only blocking devices available for controlling access of
80. See, e.g., Parental Choice in Television Programming, Pub. L. No, 104-104, 110 Stat.
56, 139 (1996); Communications Decency Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56, 133-
35 (1996).
81. Cable Communications Policy Act, 47 U.S.C. § 544(d)(2) (2000).
82. Leased access channels are set aside by a cable operator for use by unaffiliated
commercial programmers. 47 C.F.R. § 76.701 (2002).
83. Cable Communications Policy Act, 47 U.S.C. § 532(h) (2000) (allowing franchising
authorities and cable operators to prohibit as a condition in a franchise the transmission of
obscene cable services, or services which are otherwise constitutionally unprotected). See also
Stephen R. Ross and Barrett L. Brick, The Cable Act of 1984-How Did We Get There and
Where are We Going?, 39 FED. COMM. L.J. 27 (1987).
84, 47 U.S.C. § 544 (2000).
85. Id. § 544(d)(2).
86. H.R. REP. No. 98-934, at 70 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4655, 4707.
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minors to objectionable speech on cable television, 87 a lockbox allows
parents to restrict children's access to selected channels whether or
not they are "physically present and actively supervise. 88 In essence,
lockboxes are opt-out devices that allow a subscriber to block
controversial programming from entering into his or her home.89
Cable subscribers could block cable channels on a voluntary
basis by acquiring any of several channel-blocking devices available
in the market before 1984.90  But the availability of obscenity,
indecency and other objectionable content on Cable TV, "such as
'fighting words' and speech which presents a 'clear and present
danger' to public order"91 resulted in the legislation mandating cable
operators to provide requesting customers with lockboxes by sale or
lease. Legislators saw the lockbox as "one means to effectively
restrict the availability of such programming, particularly with respect
to child viewers, without infringing the First Amendment rights of the
cable operator, the cable programmer, or other cable viewers.
' 92
The lockbox provision was the first congressional output based
on an end user controlled blocking mechanism. It accompanied other
state and municipal initiatives relying on end user controlled blocking
mechanisms that addressed local concerns of access of minors to
harmful speech on cable television.93 It is significant to point out that
Congress did not assess the effectiveness of existing lockboxes at the
time of the CCPA's adoption. Congress did not include as part of the
legislation a mandate to evaluate the effectiveness of the lockbox
provision, nor did it delegate to an administrative agency, like the
87. Mediascope, Television Broadcasting Technologies, MEDIASCOPE ISSUE BRIEFS, at
http://www.mediascope.org/pubs/ibriefs/tbt.htm (last revised Mar. 9, 2000).
88. Alliance for Cmty. Media v. FCC, 56 F.3d 105, 141 (D.C. Cir. 1995), rev'd sub nom.
Denver Area Educ. Telecomms. Consortium v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727 (1996).
89. Altmann v. Television Signal Corp., 849 F. Supp. 1335, 1343-44 (N.D. Cal. 1994).
90. Harry F. Waters and Eric Gelman, Cable's Blues in the Night, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 24,
1981, at 48.
91. H.R. REP. No. 98-934, at 69 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4655, 4706.
92. H.R. REP. No. 98-934, at 70 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4655, 4707.
93. Prior to 1984, a few local franchising authorities were demanding cable operators to
provide free lockboxes to requesting subscribers as part of their franchising agreements. See,
e.g., Marcia Slacum Greene, Cable TV Plans for District, THE WASH. POST, July 19, 1984, at
D.C.3; Rushworth M. Kidder, Cable TV: Do Bostonians Care Enough to See the Very Best?,
THE CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, June 5, 1981, at 1; Tom Sherwood, City Amends Cable Rules on
Minorities, THE WASH. POST, Apr. 7, 1982, at Cl. A few states were also considering the
adoption of regulations mandating the distribution of lockboxes to cable subscribers. See, e.g.,
Maggie Kleinman, State Seeks Rules for 'Hard R' Cable TV, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 8, 1981, § 11, at
36; Sally Bedell Smith, Channel J Pornography is Cause of Lockout Law, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 5,
1984, at C16.
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FCC, the evaluation of the provision. The FCC undertook a rule
making proceeding to clarify the extent of the legislation.94
Channel blocking devices are criticized by those who claim that
parents must be on the lookout for programming in a specific channel
before blocking the channel, and still risk the chance that the cable
operator might alter the allocation of channels in the system, and
leave the technological protection useless. 95 There is no information
available on the number of households with channel-blocking
devices, and no data appears to be available on the use of those
channel-blocking devices in American households. As for lockboxes,
there have been no formal evaluations on the effectiveness of the
regulation, but the lockbox provision remains in effect.
V-chip/ Television Parental Guidelines.
The second U.S. attempt to rely on an end user controlled
blocking mechanism took place in compliance with the
Telecommunications Act of 1996, when all television manufacturers
were required to install a V-chip in every TV set-13 inches or
larger-to be sold in the United States.96 Following a Canadian
initiative, Congress adopted the new V-chip technology, which allows
viewers to block certain types of undesired programming, such as
violent, sexually explicit, or other indecent programming, regardless
of the channel or hour of transmission.97 As a result of the extensive
findings included in Section 551 of the Telecommunications Act of
1996 with respect to the influence of television on children and the
need to provide parents with useful tools for blocking harmful
programming, 98 Congress called for the establishment of guidelines
and recommended procedures for rating and encoding programs that
contain violent, sexually explicit or other indecent materials about
which parents should be informed before they are presented to
children. Subsection 551(2) orders the FCC to supervise the
implementation of this provision.
94. See Lockbox Enforcement, 47 C.F.R. § 76.11 (2002); ACLU v. FCC, 823 F.2d 1554,
1579 (D.C. Cir. 1987), cert. denied., 485 U.S. 959 (1988).
95. See, e.g., Brief for Respondents at 36, Denver Area Educ. Telecomm. Consortium v.
FCC, 518 U.S. 727 (1996) (Nos. 95-124 and 95-227).
96. Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104 § 551, 110 Stat. 56, 139
(1996).
97. Diane Roberts, The Jurisprudence of Ratings, Symposium Part I.- On the Plurality of
Ratings, 15 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 105, 111-12 (1997).
98. Telecommunications Act § 55 1.
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Additionally, Congress enacted the Technology Fund Act of
1996, which established a national policy to encourage the
development of technology "which would empower parents to block
programming they deem inappropriate for their children and to
encourage the availability thereof to low income parents," and also to
"establish and promote effective procedures, standards, systems,
advisories, or other mechanisms for ensuring that users have easy and
complete access to the information necessary to effectively utilize
blocking technology." 99
As a result of the technology selected, 00 a common system of
ratings had to be adopted, to be used both by programmers to encode
the content labels, and by viewers to activate the V-chip options
available in their TV sets.' 10 The Television Parental Guidelines
("TVPG") was the system of ratings selected. The entertainment
industries agreed in 1996 to develop and implement the ratings, in
part because of the enormous pressure both from the White House
and Congress. 102  The initial system was designed by Jack Valenti,
executive director of the Motion Picture Association of America
("MPAA"), and jointly submitted by the National Association of
Broadcasters ("NAB"), the National Cable Television Association
99. Telecommunications Act § 552 (codified as part of 47 U.S.C. § 303).
100. Transmission of the program rating information is embedded in each frame of the
television program in the VBI, or the portion of the scanning not used for any audio or video
purposes. The FCC adopted as the common blocking technology standard the Electronics
Industry Association's (EIA) 608 standard, "Recommended Practice for Line 21 Data Service"
which incorporated EIA-744 standard "Transport of Content Advisory Information Using
Extended Data Service (XDS)." See In the Matter of Implementation of Section 551 of the
Telecommunications Act of 1996; Video Programming Ratings, 13 F.C.C.R. 8232 (1998)
[hereinafter FCC Report 1998].
101. The need to apply a system of ratings originally appeared as part of a 1993 agreement
between broadcasters and congressional leaders to avoid legislation addressing violence on
television. 142 CONG. REC. S1611, S1631 (daily ed. Mar. 7, 1996) (joint standards on
violence). The networks announced the support to the joint standards on violence in 1992 and
established a parental advisory system in the summer of 1993. Under the agreement,
broadcasters and cable programmers began to air specific information in the form of parental
advisories at the beginning of some programming. See Paul Farhi, Clinton to Pursue Advisories
for TV; Ratings Would Be Similar To Those Used for Movies, THE WASH. POST, Jan. 31, 1996,
at DOI. These early warnings were transmitted mostly on made-for-TV movies and theatrical
releases that contained acts of violence or sexual situations. Id.
102. See Amy Fitzgerald Ryan, Don't Touch That V-Chip: A Constitutional Defense of the
Television Program Rating Provisions of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 87 GEO. L.J. 823
(1999) (noting that support for the Act came "from all sides of the political spectrum" and
included President Clinton, Republican Senate Majority Leader Robert Dole, William Bennett,
the former education secretary well known for his conservative views, and Congressman
Edward Markey [D - Mass.]).
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("NCTA") and the MPAA. 103 The new system, submitted to the FCC
in 1996, consisted of an age-based system of ratings modeled after the
MPAA system. The entertainment industries began implementation
of the TVPG in early January 1997.104 An administrative procedure
that promoted participation from public advocacy groups resulted in
the addition of guidelines containing content indicators.' 05 In October
of 1997, the revised TVPG system was adopted and implemented by
television broadcasters and networks, cable programmers and
operators, and television program producers.10 6  It included six
descriptive labels indicating the appropriateness of video
programming to children according to age and/or maturity, and
content indicators concerning sexual situations, violence, language or
dialogue. 107
Though the encoded ratings and descriptive labels accompany an
entire program, the rating icons and associated content symbols of the
TVPG appear only for 15 seconds at the beginning of all rated
programming, for parental guidance. Cable networks and television
stations agreed to provide rating information to newspapers and
publishers of printed and electronic program guides, and also to
request that these publishers include the appropriate information in
their guides. The voluntary system of ratings became a form of state-
sponsored self-regulation of broadcasting and cable TV. The TVPG
103. MPAA's executive director Jack Valenti had designed and implemented the voluntary
system of ratings adopted for the MPAA and the National Association of Theatre Owners on
Nov. 1, 1968. See Jack Valenti, Movie Rating System Celebrates 33rd Anniversary with
Overwhelming Parental Support, Press Release, at
http://www.mpaa.org/jack/2001/2001_10-30.htm (Oct. 30, 2001).
104. See FCC Report 1998, supra note 100.
105. See Public Notice, Commission Seeks Comment on Industry Proposal for Rating
Video Programming, CS Docket No. 97-55, FCC 97-34 (Feb. 7, 1997), available at
http://www.fcc.gov (last visited Feb. 18, 2004). See also FCC Report 1998, supra note 100;
Joint Statement of Motion Picture Association ofAmerica, National Association of Broadcasters
and National Cable Television Association, at http://www.fcc.gov/vchip/revprop.pdf (July 10,
1997) (informing that after negotiations with public advocacy groups like the Center for Media
Education, National Association for Family and Community Education, and Morality in Media,
the industry decided to incorporate content categories to the age-based criteria previously
developed for TVPG).
106. FCC Report 1998, supra note 100.
107. Regardless of claims by advocacy groups to the FCC calling for systems that would
accommodate alternative rating systems, the FCC did not direct television manufacturers to
accommodate alternative systems, but limited itself to "encouraging" manufacturers to "design
TV receivers to provide for additional ratings systems to the extent practical." Id. The FCC
reasoned that Section 55 1(e) contemplated only a voluntary system developed by the industry,
and that the congressional action "did not intend that we mandate accessibility to alternative
ratings systems." Id.
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applies to all video programming except for news, sports, commercial
advertisement, station promotions, and unedited MPAA rated movies
on premium cable channels.' 0 8 Networks and producers of each show
determine the television rating system.'0 9 An Oversight Monitoring
Board, established by the entertainment industries, supervises and
assists in the development of the content rating system." 0
Initial FCC surveys show compliance with the installation
requirement by electronics manufacturers, and compliance with the
ratings, labeling and encoding of information in television
programming by the cable and broadcast television industries. '
Mass media consumption studies evaluating the acceptance of the V-
chip technology in American homes show that an increasing number
of parents are relying on the TVPG for information purposes, but
usage of the V-chip blocking capabilities remain low.1' 2 Because
studies show that parents still support the V-chip initiative, these low
numbers can be justified by a prevailing lack of understanding among
parents on how the V-chip/Television Parental Guidelines system
108. The Telecommunications Act of 1996 made no reference to commercial advertising
or in-station promotions, but stations are not encoding or rating these categories. Nonetheless,
the FCC noted that failure to rate advertisements individually will not defeat the purpose of
Congress in enacting Section 551. See FCC Report, supra note 100. The FCC also considered
that it was not unreasonable for the Industry to exempt sports and news programming. Id.
109. See NAB, About the TV Ratings and V-Chip, at http://www.tvguidelines.org (last
visited Feb. 23, 2004).
110. The Board evaluates criticisms of ratings, to ensure the accuracy of the system. It
includes a chairman and 23 members (six members each from the broadcast television industry,
the cable industry, and the program production community, and five from public advocacy
groups, selected by the Chairman). See generally FCC Report 1998, supra note 100. See also
NAB, About the TV Ratings and V-Chip, supra note 109.
111. See FCC, FCC V-Chip Task Force Releases Updated Survey on the Encoding of
Video Programming, at
http://www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/Miscellaneous/News_ Releases/2000/nrmcOO04.html (Jan. 11,
2000); FCC, FCC V-Chip Task Force Updates V-Chip Encoding Survey, at
http://www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/MassMedia/News Releases/2000/nrmm0003.html (Feb. 9,
2000). See also FCC, Commissioner Gloria Tristani Commends Manufacturers for Meeting
Deadlines to Install V-Chips in Televisions, at
http://www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/Miscellaneous/NewsReleases/I 999/nrmc9O4O.html (June 9,
1999).
112. See generally Kaiser Family Foundation, Parents and the V-chip, at
http://www.kff.org/entmedia/1477-index.cfm (May 1999). See also Emory H. Woodard, IV,
Media in the Home 2000, The Annenberg Public Policy Center, at http://www.appcpenn.org
(last visited Feb. 17, 2004); Elizabeth Jensen, Studies Find Parents Don't Use TV Content
Ratings, L.A. TIMES, June 26, 2000, at 4F; Poll Shows Parents Lukewarm to V-Chip, at
http://www.media-awareness.ca/english/resources/articies/violence/parents-vchip-poll.cfm
(May 27, 1998); Kaiser Family Foundation, New Survey Finds Most Parents Want to Use the V-
Chip, But Aren't Well Informed About How to Do So, at http://www.kff.org/entmedia/1477-
vchip.cfm (May 10, 1999).
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operates. 113  Supporters of the system call for better educational
efforts targeting parents, and insist on the need to provide more time
before the system achieves higher levels of understanding and
usage."14 Critics have contended that the V-chip/TVPG system is not
being widely accepted by the general population because it is
subjective, confusing, and it does not cover certain forms of content,
such as sports, advertisements, station promotions, or newscasts,
which could include materials that some end users might find
controversial. " 15
Internet Filters.
Congress is relying on software filters as part of its attempt to
prevent children from accessing sexually explicit content and other
objectionable materials on the Internet. There are different types of
Internet filters, also known as content software filters. Computer
Professionals for Social Responsibility, a public-interest alliance of
computer scientists involved in research in software filters, defines a
content software filter as "one or more pieces of software that work
together to prevent users from viewing material found on the
Internet." 16 The process of filtering can take place at different levels
on the Internet, though there are three major points: (1) at the sender's
level, also referred to as the server-level, which is the place of
origination of the speech (the web site containing the objectionable
speech); (2) at the Internet Service Provider's level (ISP);" 7 or (3) at
the receiver's or end user's level. Filtering at the server-level requires
web site creators or operators to install filtering devices in their sites
113. See generally Kaiser Family Foundation, Parents and the V-chip, supra note 112.
See also Woodard, supra note 112; Jensen, supra note 112; Kaiser Family Foundation, New
Survey Finds Most Parents Want to Use the V-Chip, But Aren't Well Informed About How to Do
So, supra note 112.
114. Kaiser Family Foundation, supra note 112 (Center for Media Education President K.
Montgomery, noting the need for more educational campaigns).
115. Nevertheless, this could change as the new generation of V-chip technology for
digital television might provide blocking of these types of contents. This new generation is
expected to be able to block portions of a program, instead of the entire program. See Harry
Bruinius, Ad Blocking Goes Traditional: How iTV and D VRs are Changing Things, CHANNEL
SEVEN, at http://www.channelseven.com/newsbeat/2001features/news20010517.shtml (May 17,
2001).
116. Harry Hochheiser, Computer Professionals for Social Responsibility: Filtering FAQ,
Version 1.2, at http://www.cpsr.org/filters/faq.html#5.0 (Apr. 6, 2001).
117. Internet Service Providers (ISPs) are organizations that provide access to the Internet
to individuals or enterprises. Larger ISPs, such as AOL, also provide content services for their
subscribers. See generally BRUCE M. OWEN, THE INTERNET CHALLENGE TO TELEVISION 215-
18(1999).
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capable of identifying visitors who do not comply with age
requirements established for their site.' 18 Filtering at the ISP's level
requires ISPs to install filtering software and block the objectionable
speech coming into or departing from their servers. A number of
ISPs in the United States provide filtered Internet access to their
clients.'1 9 Finally, filtering software at the end user's level acts as a
personal technological gatekeeper, excluding materials at the end
users' level rather than at the point of origin or points of
retransmission.
There are several types of end user controlled content filters.
The first ones in the market were stand-alone systems, which included
both the filtering software and the technical mechanisms for
determining which web sites should be blocked. A single vendor sold
both items.1 20  These early filters were criticized heavily for relying
on words, and sequences of words, which resulted on sites being
blocked even if they contained valuable information, for the simple
presence of one of the words included in the vendor's black list.1 2'
Early filters were also criticized for depending on the judgmental
value of the vendor, who at times would not even disclose the list of
objectionable terms to the public. 122  As a result, critics argued that
the use of filtering software could represent a form of private
censorship. 1
23
The enormous growth of the Internet promoted the appearance of
several options for the end users. 124 Although most content filters are
focused on the Web, some systems claim that they can filter other
modes for communicating on the Internet, such as Newsgroups, Chat
118. See Age Verification Systems, COPA Commission Report, at
http://www.copacommission.org/report (Oct. 20, 2000).
119. For a discussion of internet services providing filtered internet access, see Steve
Watters, New Internet Services Help Parents Protect Children From Online Porn, at
http://www.family.org/cforum/citizenmag/features/a0001556.cfin (last visited Mar. 9, 2004).
120. Hochheiser, supra note 116, at 4.
121. Lawrence Lessig, Wat Things Regulate Speech: CDA 2.0 vs. Filtering, 38
JURIMETRICS J. 629, 654 (1998). "The blocking effected by these systems is crude, and the
effect of the blocking created is far too broad." Id.
122. See generally Junichi P. Semitsu, Burning Cyberbooks in Public Libraries: Internet
Filtering Software vs. The First Amendment, 52 STAN. L. REv. 509 (2000).
123. See, e.g., Electronic Privacy Information Center, Report: Faulty Filters: How Content
Filters Block Access to Kid-Friendly Information on the Internet [hereinafter EPIC Report], at
http://www2.epic.org/reports/filter-report.html (Dec. 1997).
124. See generally Marcy Zitz, Selecting Filtering Software for Your Family, at
http://familyintemet.about.com/library/weekly/aa022100a.htm (last visited Feb. 19, 2004). See
also Enough is Enough Filtering Software Guide, at
http://www.enough.org/summit/software.html (last visited Feb. 19, 2004).
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rooms, e-mails, and the like.125 Although stand-alone systems are still
available, newer systems of filtering software have appeared,
promoted by the development of a common protocol for recognizing
ratings online. The Platform for Internet Content Selection
("PICS") 126  was developed by the WWW3  Consortium, an
organization encompassing various Internet organizations that was
concerned with the increasing Congressional attempts to regulate
content online. 27 PICS is a content-neutral protocol that allows end
users to select the type of content that they do not want to see
displayed on their computers or, most probably, on their children's
computers. 28 PICS operates under two main components: a ratings
system and software that uses the ratings systems to filter content.
29
PICS works together with a system of ratings that must be encoded in
the web site by the web page developer or by a third party providing
ratings of Internet pages. 130
Several of the most popular filtering software on the market
today is "PICS compatible." This software has the potential of
adapting itself more precisely to the needs of end users than stand-
alone filtering software because, as an open standard, PICS can be
used for various categories of objectionable speech.131 With PICS, an
interested parent can determine, for example, that in the same
computer her 16-year-old daughter might access most web sites, with
the exception of sites promoting drugs or containing sexually explicit
images, while her 7-year-old son will not be able to access sites
containing partial nudity, alcohol, indecent language or other types of
controversial information. The interested parent selects the levels of
125. Hochheiser, supra note 116.
126. Paul Resnick, Filtering Information on the Internet, at
http://www.hackvancom/pub/stig/articles/trusted-systems/O397resnick.html (Mar. 1997). PICS
was developed by James Miller of MIT and Paul Resnik of AT&T Research. The system
provides for a standard platform so other filtering software and ratings provided by web page
creators can interoperate within a single standard. See also R. Polk Wagner, Filters and the
First Amendment, 83 MINN. L. REv. 755, 764 (1999).
127. World-Wide-Web Consortium PICS Home Page, at http://www.w3.org/PICS (last
visited Feb. 19, 2004).
128. Hochheiser, supra note 116.
129. Id. Each request done by the user is evaluated by the filtering software and "[i]f the
resource is on the 'not allowed' list, or if it does not have the proper PICS rating, the filtering
software tells the user that access has been denied and the browser does not display the contents
of the web site." Id.
130. Id. (noting that content in web sites is categorized using judgmental values of those
designing the ratings).
131. See Semitsu, supra note 122, at 517.
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access for each user and keeps the passwords for security purposes so
the children cannot circumvent the filtering device.
Users of PICS software are not tied to the judgments of the
software vendor, and the descriptions of the criteria used by the
ratings systems are publicly available.1 32  Nevertheless, users still
have to rely on ratings provided by third party companies, which
might include their share of biases and viewpoints, or on the
voluntary ratings provided by web page creators, which could be
subjective. 133
Properly implemented, the Internet can accommodate multiple
filtering systems, giving users and parents the opportunity to select
and block information based on a true diversity of information.1
34
Use of filtering software at the end user's level has become quite
frequent in schools and libraries where filters are used as a means to
keep minors from accessing objectionable materials while surfing the
Net.
Regulating Speech Online While Promoting End User-
Controlled Filters.
Congress has attempted to regulate the access of minors to
objectionable speech online in three instances. The first partially
aborted policy output took place with the passing of the
Communications Decency Act (CDA). 135 The CDA-also a part of
the Telecommunications Act of 1996-was an extensive piece of
legislation introduced as an attempt to protect children and families
from the threat of sexually explicit communications online. 36 Parts
of the CDA criminalized the "knowing" transmission of "obscene or
indecent" messages over the Internet to any recipient under 18 years
132. Hochheiser, supra note 116.
133. Ratings are essential to operate. The Internet Content Rating Association (ICRA) is
an international organization that claims that effective PICS based filtering software protect
children from potentially harmful materials and protect free speech on the Internet. ICRA does
not rate the content, thus avoiding value judgments about sites. The Internet Content Rating
Association homepage, at http://www.icra.org/ (last visited Feb. 19, 2004). ICRA provides
electronic questionnaires for web page authors to rate their web pages and label their sites so
PICS software can recognize them and act upon the rating provided. Id. The categories
measure the nudity and sexual content of a site, the violence depicted on the site, and other
objectionable content available, such as gambling, drugs and alcohol. Id.
134. Hochheiser, supra note 116.
135. See Communications Decency Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56, 133-
35 (1996), 47 U.S.C. § 223(a)-(h) (1997).
136. See generally Rappaport, supra note 11.
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of age. 37  Among the list of affirmative defenses for web content
providers included in the Act, was protection for those who embraced
blocking technologies at the server's level, such as filtering
software. 138  The CDA also included Section 509, entitled Online
Family Empowerment, which established a new national policy for
the Internet encouraging the development of filtering technologies
"that empower parents to restrict their children's access to
objectionable or inappropriate online material."' 139 Congress did not
mandate the use of filtering technologies in the CDA, but it embraced
the benefits of filtering technologies both by the end user and the
content provider.
In Reno v. ACLU, the Supreme Court held that CDA's anti-
indecency provisions abridged the free speech clause of the First
Amendment.140  The Court noted the existence of less restrictive
alternatives to the criminal provisions contained in the CDA and
among those alternatives mentioned reliance on end user-based
filtering and blocking mechanisms.' 4 ' The application of strict
scrutiny for the Internet constituted an important element in the Reno
decision. 142  In Reno, the Court said, in reference to content-based
online restrictions, if a less restrictive alternative would serve the
government's purpose, the legislature must use that alternative.1
43
Neither the "family empowerment" provisions of CDA, nor the
affirmative defenses for content providers were challenged in the
courts and remain valid today.
137. See 47 U.S.C.A. § 223(e)(l)-(6) (West Supp. 1997). The CDA also prohibited the
"knowing" sending or displaying to a person under 18 of any message "that, in context, depicts
or describes, in terms patently offensive as measured by contemporary community standards,
sexual or excretory activities or organs."
138. See Id.
139. Communications Decency Act, § 509,47 U.S.C. § 230(b)(3)-(5) (1997).
140. 521 U.S. 844, 874 (1997) (holding that the Act "suppresses a large amount of speech
that adults have a constitutional right to receive and to address to one another").
141. Id. This action by the Court has been criticized by some who say that it was based on
technologies not proven at the time:
The success in Reno then came from convincing the Court that there were other
less restrictive means-that techniques did exist for keeping kids from por-and
that these other techniques would be less burdensome on speech. The success
was to convince the Court to err on the side of activism-to force Congress to
wait, to see what alternatives might develop. Let the market, let the code, let the
parents, let something else make sure that porn is kept from kids. It's too early,
the Court was convinced, to call in the marshal.
Lessig, supra note 121, at 631.
142. Reno, 521 U.S. at 844.
143. Id. at 874-75.
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The second Congressional policy output took place in 1998
when Congress passed the Children Online Protection Act
("COPA"). 44  The law makes it a crime to put sexually explicit
material for commercial purposes that can be viewed by minors on
the World Wide Web. 145 COPA differs from the CDA in its focus on
commercial web content providers, and in its definition of indecency,
for which it applies a test similar to the obscenity community
standards developed by the Supreme Court in Miller.146  The new
statute makes reference to filtering and blocking technologies because
like the CDA, COPA includes affirmative defenses to prosecution
based on technological measures, including server-side filtering
mechanisms. 147 COPA has never been fully implemented. In 1998,
the statute was challenged in court by a group of organizations
claiming that the law constituted a violation of their First Amendment
rights because of the application of local community standards
contained in the Act.' 48  Nevertheless, the Supreme Court already
rejected that local standards for determination of certain objectionable
content in the Internet made COPA unconstitutional.
49
With its third attempt, Congress followed other state and local
initiatives to regulate access of minors to harmful speech online while
using computers in schools and public libraries.150  The Children's
144. Pub. L. No. 105-277, 112 Stat. 2681, 47 U.S.C. § 231 (2000).
145. Id.
146. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
147. 47 U.S.C. § 23 1(c) (2000).
148. ACLU v. Reno, 217 F.3d 162 (3d Cir. 2000), vacatedsub nom. by Ashcroft v. ACLU,
535 U.S. 564 (2002). The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed a preliminary
injunction by the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania noting that the
statute required every Internet content provider subjected to the statute to abide by the most
restrictive and conservative state's community standards in order to avoid criminal liability.
Because of the inability of Web publishers to restrict access to their Web sites based on the
visitor's geographic location, the statute imposed an impermissible burden on protected speech.
Id.
149. The Supreme Court decided in Ashcroft that COPA was not unconstitutional because
of its application of local community standards for the Internet, but issues surrounding the
effectiveness of blocking mechanisms were not considered by the Court. 525 U.S. at 564.
150. These initiatives include the following: ARIZ. REV. STAT, § 34-502 (2000); ARK.
CODE ANN. § 6-21-111 (2001) (public school Internet filters); ARK, CODE ANN. § 13-2-104
(repealed 2003) (computer use policy); COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-90-404 (2001); LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 17:100.7 (West 2001) (policies; governing authorities of public elementary and
secondary schools; Internet and online sites; access by students and employees; exceptions);
MD. CODE ANN. [STATE FINN. & PROC.] § 3-409 (2001); S.C. CODE ANN. § 10-1-206 (2000)
(library pilot program for internet filtering software); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-24-55 (Michie
2001) (public schools to restrict access to obscene materials on public access computers); VA.
CODE ANN. § 22.1-70.2 (Michie 2001) (acceptable Internet use policies for public and private
schools).
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Internet Protection Act ("CIPA"), passed in December 2000, requires
schools receiving certain federal funds to certify that they have
implemented a policy for Internet safety for minors in all elementary
and secondary schools.15' The policy adopted must include operation
in all computers with Internet access of a "technology protection
measure" to block access to objectionable content online, which could
mean the installment of filtering software.152 If the school does not
comply with the requirement, it will not benefit from the federal
funds. 53 Another provision of the Act conditions the use by libraries
of other federal funds, this time those assigned by the Museum and
Library Services Act.154  The Act requires local policies to be
adopted, which should include technology-based protection measures
that can block access to obscene materials as defined in Section 1460
of the criminal code,155 child pornography, as defined in Section 2256
of the criminal code, 156 sexual acts and sexual contacts, as defined in
Section 2246 of the criminal code,' 57 and content that is harmful to
minors. 58 Unlike other blocking legislative initiatives, CIPA orders
the study of filtering technologies, and it provides for an assessment
of the effectiveness of the Internet policies adopted in accordance
with the law.' 59 The CIPA places the determination of what
151. 106 H.R. 5666 § 3601(a)(l)(A)(i) (2000).
152. Id.
153. 47 U.S.C. § 254(h) (providing libraries and schools with discounted rates for access
to telecommunication services, including local and long distance telephone service, high speed
Internet access and internal network connections. There are up to $2.25 billion available to
eligible schools and libraries). See also 47 C.F.R. § 54.507 (2002).
154. Museum and Library Services Act, 20 U.S.C. § 9134(b) (2000).
155. 18 U.S.C. § 1460 (2000).
156. Id. § 2256.
157. Id. § 2246.
158. See 106 H.R. 5666 § 1703(b)(1) (2000).
[A]ny picture, image, graphic image file, or other visual depiction that taken as a
whole and with respect to minors, appeals to a prurient interest in nudity, sex, or
excretion; depicts, describes, or represents, in a patently offensive way with
respect to what is suitable for minors, an actual or simulated sexual act or sexual
contact, actual or simulated normal or perverted sexual acts, or a lewd exhibition
of the genitals; and taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or
scientific value as to minors.
Id. at (b)(2).
159. Id. at § 1703(a)(I)-(3). The National Telecommunications and Information
Administration (NTIA) will engage in an evaluation process to determine "whether or not
currently available technology protection measures, including commercial Internet blocking and
filtering software, adequately addresses the needs of educational institutions." Id. NTIA is
expected to make "recommendations on how to foster the development of measures that meet
such needs," and to evaluate "the development and effectiveness of local Internet safety policies
that are currently in operation after community input." Id.
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constitutes material that is "inappropriate for minors" in the hands of
the local authorities.' 60  CIPA was challenged on constitutional
grounds.161
Constitutionality of Regulations Based on End User-Controlled
Blocking Mechanisms.
State actions promoting or mandating the use of blocking
mechanisms reliant on technology have the potential of becoming a
less restrictive alternative for regulation of content that is harmful to
minors in a new electronic media environment. 162  The Supreme
Court has said that a content-based speech restriction can stand only if
it satisfies strict scrutiny, so the statute must be narrowly tailored to
promote a compelling government interest.' 63  If there is a less
restrictive alternative that would serve the government's purpose,
then that alternative must be used.164 "To do otherwise," as Justice
Kennedy wrote for the Court in United States v. Playboy
Entertainment Group, "would be to restrict speech without an
adequate justification, a course the First Amendment does not
permit."1 65  The Court has stated that the government has a
compelling interest in protecting minors from the harmful effects of
media content. 166 But, the Court has refused to hold state actions that
limit the adult population only to content that is fit for children as
constitutionally valid.
1 67
Narrowly tailored regulations promoting or mandating the use of
blocking mechanisms to address the compelling interest of assisting
parents in protecting children from the harmful effects of pre-
determined forms of objectionable materials over a converged
160. Accompanying the CIPA, Congress also passed the Neighborhood Children's Internet
Protection Act (NCIPA). Id. at §§ 1731 et seq. NCIPA requires as part of schools and libraries'
Internet safety policies to address access by minors to inappropriate matter on the Internet,
including the World Wide Web, and the safety and security of minors when using electronic
mail and chat rooms. Id.
161. See Am. Library Ass'n v. United States, 201 F. Supp. 2d 401 (E.D. Pa. 2002)
(considering the constitutionality of CIPA).
162. See, e.g., United States v. Playboy Entm't Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 825-26 (2000).
163. Sable Communications of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989).
164. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 874 (1997); Sable Communications, 492 U.S. at 126.
165. Playboy, 529 U.S. at 813.
166. See Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 639 (1968); FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438
U.S. 726, 749 (1978).
167. See Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380, 383 (1957); Sable Communications, 492 U.S.
at 128; Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 73 (1983); Reno, 521 U.S. at 875;
Playboy, 529 U.S. at 803.
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electronic mass media transmitting in multiple platforms, some of
which transcend territorial boundaries-should satisfy a court's
application of strict scrutiny.
So far, the Supreme Court has suggested that blocking
mechanisms reliant on technology might be more effective for
electronic media that is not as invasive as broadcasting, such as
Internet and Cable television.' 68  First, in Denver Area Educational
Telecommunications Consortium v. Federal Communications
Commission, the Court highlighted the potential benefits of blocking
mechanisms in the context of Cable TV. 16 9 Then, in Reno v. ACLU,
while striking down a provision of the CDA that imposed a ban on
"patently offensive" communications on the Internet by criminalizing
exposure of the material to minors, 170 the Court noted the existence of
less restrictive alternatives, among them reliance on end user-based
filtering and blocking mechanisms.' 71  A few years later, in
Playboy,172 the Supreme Court declared unconstitutional another
provision of the CDA-Section 505, preventing signal
bleeding-which required cable TV operators to fully scramble or
fully block premium channels carrying sexually oriented
programming, or otherwise channel the transmission of adult content
to a safe-harbor period.173 Applying strict scrutiny, the Supreme Court
168. In other instances the Supreme Court has considered sender-controlled blocking
schemes for the electronic media. See Sable Communications, 492 U.S. at 130 (considering the
constitutionality of a federal statute regulating sexually oriented prerecorded telephone
messages, better known as "dial-a-porn services"); Capital Cities Cable v. Crisp, 467 U.S. 691
(1984) (declaring unconstitutional-under the Supremacy Clause, not the First Amendment-an
action taken by the state of Oklahoma, ordering cable operators to block alcoholic
advertisements). See also Denver Area Educ. Telecomms. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S.
727 (1996) (declaring unconstitutional certain provisions of the Cable Consumer Protection Act
of 1992).
169. 518 U.S. 727 (1996) (holding unconstitutional two out of three provisions of the
Cable Consumer Protection Act of 1992: a requirement that cable operators "segregate-and-
block" sexually explicit patently offensive programming, and another provision that permitted
cable operators to prohibit indecent programming over public access PEG channels. The third
provision, which permitted cable TV operators to prohibit indecent programming on leased-
access channels, was declared valid under the First Amendment).
170. 47 U.S.C. § 223(a), (d) (2000).
171. Reno, 521 U.S. at 874.
172. Playboy, 529 U.S. at 808.
173. Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104 § 505, 110 Stat. 136, 47
U.S.C. § 561 (2000). Signal bleeding refers to the audio or video portions of the scrambled
programs that resulted from imprecision of the scrambling technology. Cable operators use
scrambling technology to avoid access of unsubscribed customers to certain programming, but
imprecision of the scrambling technology used on analog systems can result in a leakage of parts
of the visual images or sounds of the scrambled programs. See Playboy, 529 U.S. at 808. This
imprecision, where unsubscribed customers might hear or see portions of the unscrambled
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determined that less restrictive alternatives existed to the time-
channeling requirement of the provision, and therefore, Section 505
was a violation of the First Amendment. Justice Kennedy wrote, "a
regime in which viewers could order signal blocking on a household-
by-household basis presented an effective, less restrictive alternative
to § 505. ' ' 174
Regulatory Approach Based on Blocking Mechanisms is Still
Too Recent for Assessment.
Regulations based on blocking mechanisms controlled by the
end user are still in their infancy, and they are limited to a voluntary,
single medium approach. Problems associated with the early stages
of the regulations include low levels of reception by the general
public. Although the number of end users relying on blocking
mechanisms remains low, these numbers are increasing, and it is not
realistic to anticipate that all houses will need to use these
mechanisms. As has been noted elsewhere, there are no children
living in more than 63% of all American homes. 7 5 Therefore, it can
be assumed that in almost two-thirds of American homes there will be
no need to adopt blocking mechanisms aimed at protection of minors.
Also, not every parent will consider that there is a need to protect
his/her children from controversial speech; therefore, the success or
failure of blocking mechanisms cannot be assessed only by the
percentages of homes using these mechanisms. Other problems
associated with the regulations include a large parental lack of
knowledge about the new technologies, and the lack of parental
technological skills needed to activate the blocking mechanisms.
Another major problem is related to the effectiveness of the
mechanisms. There are still too many Web sites without ratings, and
there are many voices criticizing the subjective nature of the
ratings. 176  Critics are challenging regulations based on blocking
programming is called "signal bleed." Id.
174. Playboy, 529 U.S. at 807.
175. Approximately 36% of all American households have children under 18 years. More
than 20 million minors reported by the U.S. census as children under the age of 18 in American
households are over 15 years of age. See Profile of General Demographic Characteristics:
2000, at
http://www2.census-2000/datasets/demographicsprofile/0-National-Summary/2khus.pdf (May
2001).
176. See generally Woodard, supra note 112; Kaiser Family Found., New Survey Finds
Most Parents Want to Use the V-Chip, But Aren't Well Informed About How to Do So, supra
note 112; Electronic Privacy Info. Ctr., Faulty Filters: How Content Filters Block Access to Kid-
Friendly Information on the Internet, supra note 123. See also Lawrence J. Magid, Child Safety
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mechanisms, like the CIPA, because of the so-called over and under
inclusiveness of the blocking features, that is, the presence of errors in
the filtering and blocking process that might result in valid content
blocked as objectionable speech, and objectionable content finding its
way through the blocking mechanisms. 1
77
Potential Uses of Regulations Based on Blocking Mechanisms
for the New Electronic Media Environment.
Blocking mechanisms will probably play an important role in the
new electronic media environment. But for that to happen, the
mechanisms will have to evolve so that they can work in diverse
media platforms, capable of transmitting and receiving content in
more than one medium. So far, blocking mechanisms operate only in
the medium for which they were created. But with the trends of
convergence, and with the adoption of common digital platforms, it is
possible to anticipate that blocking mechanisms will be designed to
act for all electronic media content regardless of the originating
medium.
Regulations relying on blocking mechanisms also have followed
a medium-specific approach. But as technology moves forward, and
electronic media continues patterns of convergence, it is possible to
foresee regulations based on blocking mechanisms capable of
recognizing specific categories of content regardless of the medium
used. In the end, the current medium-specific approach, or the
application of some content-regulations to selected electronic media,
might result in an unnecessary distinction, as technology brings all
electronic media together in new multimedia platforms.
A regulatory approach based on blocking mechanisms provides
several potential applications for the new electronic media
environment because digital technologies allow blocking mechanisms
to monitor and block even single images and words in a television
show or a web site. 178 Therefore, blocking mechanisms in the future
could well be developed to block unwanted content on a scene-by-
on the Information Highway, at http://www.safekids.com/child_safety.htm (1998).
177. See, e.g., Faulty Filters, supra note 176; Marvin J. Johnson, The Effectiveness of the
Children Internet Protection Act, at http://www.aclu.org/congress/1040401a.html (Apr. 4, 2001)
(statement of the ACLU before the House of Representatives Committee on Energy &
Commerce, Subcommittee on Telecommunications and the Internet).
178. Since digital technology is capable of identifying tiny pixels containing a small
fraction of a frame, it is possible to foresee changes in the blocking mechanisms to recognize
segments rather than the entire program. See generally BRUCE M. OWEN, THE INTERNET
CHALLENGE To TELEVISION 116 et seq. (1999).
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scene basis, or blocking a segment of a program without blocking the
entire program. 79 They could also recognize objectionable audio
portions of a program while they allow for the remaining of the
program to be aired, or they could recognize harmful text and pictures
in a web site and act to block that content without affecting the entire
web site. For these options to work, blocking mechanisms would
need to work with more elaborate systems of ratings that provide
detailed information on diverse controversial speech.
A more elaborate system of ratings would mean that electronic
media speakers would probably have to engage in more extensive
encoding of programming. Such systems of rating and encoding
might benefit from a more precise correlation of content and harm,
where the harmful effects of the objectionable material are correlated
to specific members of the audience depending on their age, and not
necessarily on identifying everyone less than 18 years as "children" in
need of protection. As an illustration, if societal concerns are
centered on the scientifically proven harmful effects of sexually
explicit materials containing graphically explicit sexual encounters of
minors 12 years or younger, then blocking mechanisms should be
programmed by parents of these minors to block all materials fitting
that description, regardless of the medium of transmission, but
without affecting the remaining content accompanying those graphic
materials. Potential applications of these mechanisms also extend to
other non-harmful but still controversial speech if parents determine
to block such materials.
V. CONCLUSION
The availability of certain objectionable content in the electronic
media, coupled with calls from advocacy groups demanding
government intervention to protect minors from exposure to that
material and with constitutional limitations restraining Congress'
scope of action, led to the adoption of regulations relying on
technology-based blocking mechanisms. These regulations represent
the first output of what appears to be a new legislative approach to
address in a narrow manner the compelling interest of protecting
minors from harmful materials in the electronic media. Perhaps
unintended, an additional outcome of these regulations has been the
179. See generally Directorate General X of the European Commission [DG Education
and Culture], Final Report: Parental Control of Television Broadcasting, at
http://europa.eu.int/comm/avpolicy/legis/keydoc/parental control/summary-en.htm (Oct. 14,
2001).
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adoption of a new layer of content regulations for the electronic
media in the United States, one that is based on blocking mechanisms.
An expanding congressional reliance on blocking mechanisms in
a new media environment is a possibility. But solutions to a number
of variables might be required before we witness more intense
reliance on blocking mechanisms. First, there will need to be a
significant increase in the use of blocking mechanisms in United
States households. This could be expected as parents become more
technologically savvy and as the new blocking technologies prove
their feasibility. Also, more information campaigns might be needed
to educate parents on the advantages of the use of blocking
mechanisms. Second, a clearer distinction between what
objectionable materials are constitutionally protected and what are not
might be necessary. Also, there is a need for more specific
conclusions regarding the harmful effects of media contents and the
age of minors. Until these variables are solved, Congress will
probably avoid an increasing reliance on blocking mechanisms as
substitutes for traditional content regulations in the electronic media.
However, Congress might continue to apply this regulatory approach
to new challenges presented by the new electronic media
environment.
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